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Venturing into the "Impenetrable
Jungle": How California's Expansive
Public Nuisance Doctrine May Result
in an Unprecedented Judgment
Against the Lead Paint Industry in the
case of County of Santa Clara v.
Atlantic Richfield Company
Matthew R. Watson*
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that childhood
lead exposure represents the most significant childhood
environmental health problem in the state today; that too
little is known about the prevalence, long-term health
care costs, severity, and location of these problems in
California; that it is well known that the environment is
widely contaminated with lead . . . and that the cost to
society of neglecting this problem may be enormous.1
INTRODUCTION
In their treatise on the law of torts, William Prosser and
Werdner Page Keeton famously described the tort of public
* Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law 2010; B.A., McGill
University 2007. The author would like to extend sincere thanks to Derek
Cournoyer, Daniel Morton-Bentley, Julie Moore, and Professors Larry Ritchie
and Elizabeth Colt for their editorial review and insightful feedback. Also,
the author would like to express his deep gratitude to Alexandra del Solar as
well as his family for their endless support, patience, and guidance.
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124125 (West 2006).
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nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle."2 While it is difficult to
discern exactly what these famous legal scholars intended to
convey with this observation, this phrase seemingly addresses the
amorphous nature of the tort. Indeed, the tort of public nuisance
is marked by a rather broad definition - "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public."3 While
many jurisdictions in the United States have added layers to the
traditional tort of public nuisance by way of statute as well as
common law interpretation,4 the tort nevertheless retains a rather
nebulous character. This ambiguity has proved particularly
trying over the past several decades as jurisdictions across the
nation have witnessed a wave of non-traditional product-based
public nuisance claims.
One such product-based public nuisance action that has
become prevalent in the past quarter-century has been brought
against former lead paint manufacturers for the problems
associated with lead poisoning. 5  These actions have been
commenced by state and local officials, and generally allege that
the presence of lead pigment in residential premises constitutes
an unreasonable interference with the health and safety of the
public, thus qualifying as a public nuisance. 6 While a prima facie
examination of these claims suggests they comport with the
common law definition of public nuisance, courts have, by and
large, determined such claims to be inconsistent with the
requirements and traditional application of the tort.7 In fact, the
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
616 (W. Page Keeton ed., West Publishing Co. 5th ed. 1984) (1941) ("There is
perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all people, and has
been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement
to a cockroach baked in a pie.").
3. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 799 (Robert
C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 11th ed. 2005) (1951) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979)).
4. Id.
5. See Lauren E. Handler & Charles E. Erway III, Tort of Public
Nuisance in Public Entity Litigation: Return to the Jungle?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J.
484, 489 (2002).
6. Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The
Transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941,
960-61 (2007).
7. Id. at 962.
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tort of public nuisance has not yet been successfully litigated
against a lead pigment manufacturer by any municipality or state
throughout the nation 8
Despite this weight of authority, however, public nuisance
claims against former lead pigment manufacturers are still
actively pursued. Most notably, such litigation is ongoing in the
California case of County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.9
There, a number of counties and related authorities filed suit on
behalf of the People of the State of California against a collection
of former lead pigment manufacturers for the problems associated
with lead poisoning.10 In the complaints before the court, the
plaintiffs alleged a number of causes of action, including public
nuisance. 11 While the trial judge initially sustained defendants'
demurrer to this public nuisance claim, the Court of Appeal for
the Sixth District of California overruled this preliminary finding
and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to pursue a
representative public nuisance action on behalf of the People of
California. 12 Accordingly, the stage has been set for yet another
prolonged legal battle on a claim of public nuisance against lead
paint manufacturers.
This Comment provides an assessment of the likelihood of the
Santa Clara plaintiffs' success on their aforementioned public
nuisance claim. As such, this Comment contends that the
plaintiffs may in fact prevail on their claim, despite the great
weight of authority to the contrary, because California has
adopted a more expansive interpretation of public nuisance than a
number of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue to date.
Part I provides a brief history of the tort of public nuisance and
highlights its evolution in the United States. Part II examines the
advent and subsequent development of public nuisance
jurisprudence relative to product manufacturers, provides a
detailed overview of several prior public nuisance actions against
lead paint manufacturers, and identifies the reasons these claims
8. See Eric Tucker, RI. Lead Paint Loss Gives Industry Huge Win, USA
TODAY, July 6, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/200 8 -0 7-06-
1044394103_x.htm?csp=34.
9. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
10. Id. at 319.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 329-30.
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have been unsuccessful to date. Part III outlines the
requirements of public nuisance in California and highlights the
ways California courts have provided a more expansive
interpretation of the tort's boundaries than other jurisdictions
that have addressed this issue. Part IV provides a general
background of the plaintiffs' public nuisance claim in the case of
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. and highlights the
problems of lead poisoning in California. Lastly, Part V examines
the preliminary facts of the case in order to provide an assessment
of the probable result of the case.
I. GENERAL HISTORY OF THE TORT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
A. The Birth of Public Nuisance
The law of public nuisance has roots dating back to twelfth
century English common law and, in its earliest form, was used to
remedy infringements of the rights of the Crown. 13  This
application continued until the fourteenth century, when English
courts expanded the reach of public nuisance to encompass
infringements of rights common to the general public.14 Examples
of protected public rights during this early period included "the
right to safely walk along public highways, to breathe unpolluted
air, to be undisturbed by large gatherings of disorderly people and
to be free from the spreading of infectious diseases."15
B. The Evolution of Public Nuisance Jurisprudence in the United
States
With the development of American common law, courts came
to adopt the English common law concept of public nuisance. 16
The earliest public nuisance cases in America generally fell into
one of two categories: obstructions of public highways or
13. Faulk & Gray, supra note 6, at 951.
14. Id.
15. Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541,
543-44 (2006) (quoting Joseph W. Cleary, Municipalities Versus Gun
Manufacturers: Why Public Nuisance Claims Just Do Not Work, 31 U. BALT.
L. REV. 273, 277 (2002)).
16. Faulk & Gray, supra note 6, at 953.
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waterways and invasions of public morals and welfare. 17 With the
onset of the Industrial Revolution, however, public nuisance took
on a more substantive role in American jurisprudence.18 In
essence, public nuisance actions became a substitute for
governments that "could not anticipate and explicitly prohibit or
regulate through legislation all the particular activities that might
injure or annoy the general public."19 In this era, public nuisance
law provided a means to quell problems associated primarily with
air and water pollution, and such actions were predominately
criminal in nature and involved injunctive relief.20
Throughout the 1930s, public nuisance law took a backseat in
American jurisprudence; the "comprehensive statutory and
regulatory" reform of the New Deal era limited the need to utilize
the tort of public nuisance to correct social ills.21 Indeed, when
the first Restatement of Torts was published in 1939, it failed to
include a reference to the tort of public nuisance. 22
In the 1960s, however, the tort of public nuisance experienced
a resurgence in American jurisprudence. 23 Responding to such,
Dean William Prosser, and later, Dean John Wade, attempted to
codify the 900-year history of public nuisance law in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.24 After extensive debate over the
parameters of public nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
came to define a public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public."25 Further, it outlined
circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference
with a public right is unreasonable: "(a) [w]hether the conduct
involves a significant interference with the public health, the
public safety, the public peace, the public comfort, or the public
convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute,
ordinance, or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the
conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or
17. Id.
18. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 15, at 545-46.
19. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 804 (2003).
20. Faulk & Gray, supra note 6, at 954.
21. Id.
22. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 15, at 546.
23. Faulk & Gray, supra note 6, at 955.
24. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 15, at 547.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
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long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know,
has a significant effect upon the public right."26
Despite the efforts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to add
definition and clarity to the "impenetrable jungle" of public
nuisance law, this area of law retained a vague character. Indeed,
in order to further define the boundaries of this tort, a number of
jurisdictions formulated statutes to outline the requirements of a
public nuisance cause of action. 27 Moreover, in their analysis of
public nuisance actions, state courts have attempted to clarify
public nuisance law by interpreting the requirements of each
respective element of the tort.28
With the efforts of legislatures and judges to define the
requirements of public nuisance law, however, the tort has taken
different shapes in various jurisdictions. 29  Consequently, an
action, or perhaps inaction, of a defendant may constitute a public
nuisance in one jurisdiction and not comply with the established
public nuisance requirements of a separate jurisdiction.
Ultimately, although American public nuisance law principally
derives from a common source - English common law - it has
evolved differently in each respective jurisdiction.
II. APPLICATION OF THE TORT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE TO PRODUCT-
BASED CLAIMS
A. Asbestos
The confusion derived from the amorphous nature of the tort
of public nuisance has been further compounded over the past
thirty years as this tort has been utilized to pursue non-
traditional product-based claims. The advent of this practice came
in the early 1980s as several municipalities and school districts
throughout the United States utilized public nuisance claims to
recover the costs of removing asbestos from their facilities. 30
Commentators have argued that the impetus behind this
methodological approach to asbestos litigation stemmed, in large
26. Id. § 821B(2).
27. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 3.
28. See Gifford, supra note 19, at 779-80.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 751.
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part, from plaintiffs' inability to successfully pursue such claims
under products liability doctrine due to complications with issues
such as the expiration of the statute of limitations, the
impropriety of suits for pure economic loss, and the inability to
determine a particular asbestos manufacturer. 31  Despite the
prevalence of these suits, plaintiffs rarely succeeded in pursuing a
public nuisance claim against a manufacturer or distributor of
asbestos.32 Nevertheless, these suits paved the way for future
product-based public nuisance litigation.
B. Tobacco
Following the trend set by asbestos-related litigation, between
1994 and 1998, a number of states and municipalities attempted
to utilize the tort of public nuisance against the tobacco industry,
seeking reimbursement of expenditures for medical programs
related to cigarette smoking.33 Specifically, the plaintiffs in these
actions utilized the tort of public nuisance as a means to overcome
a number of defenses to product liability claims and provided the
plaintiffs a means to overcome a smoker's individual conduct. 3 4
These claims remain unresolved, however, because the litigation
ended with a massive settlement by the tobacco industry.35
Although the viability of the tort of public nuisance as applied to
the tobacco industry was never truly tested, this settlement was
deemed a great success, further providing confidence in the
potential of the application of the tort of public nuisance to
product manufacturers and distributors. 36
31. See id. at 751-53.
32. Id. at 752-53.
33. Handler & Erway, supra note 5, at 487. In addition to the
application of public nuisance, the plaintiff states and municipalities in these
actions sought to recover under theories of fraud, indemnification, unjust
enrichment, common law misrepresentation, deceptive advertising, antitrust
violations, and federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO).
Gifford, supra note 19, at 759-60.
34. Gifford, supra note 19, at 759.
35. Id. at 761-62. The tobacco industry reached the "Master Settlement
Agreement" obligating the tobacco companies to make payments totaling
$206 billion to the plaintiff states. Id. at 762. Additionally, the Master
Settlement Agreement mandated that the tobacco industry refrain from
advertising efforts directed towards youth audiences. Id.
36. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 15, at 554-55.
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C. Lead Paint
The most recent application of the tort of public nuisance for a
product-based claim has been against former lead paint
manufacturers for the problems associated with childhood lead
poisoning. These actions, like those brought against former
asbestos manufacturers and the tobacco industry, have been
brought by a number of states and municipalities throughout the
nation. To date, the tort of public nuisance has not been
successfully applied by any state or municipality against lead
paint manufacturers in any jurisdiction that has addressed the
issue. 37 Indeed, courts hearing these actions have, by and large,
found such claims against lead paint manufacturers inconsistent
with the application of public nuisance law within their respective
jurisdictions.
To highlight the purported shortcomings of public nuisance
law relative to its application against lead paint manufacturers, it
is essential to provide a background of the problems associated
with lead exposure and, in turn, to examine the holdings of the
state courts that have heard public nuisance claims against lead
paint manufacturers and distributors.
1. Lead Poisoning: An Overview
Lead is a toxic substance that, if ingested, can cause a wide
array of health problems and adversely affect many bodily organs
and metabolic functions. 38 In fact, there is no known safe level of
lead the human body can withstand.39 Low levels of lead in the
human body (10-15 parts per million) can impair cognitive
development, cause a loss of I.Q., slow the body's growth and
development rate, and inhibit the formation of enzymes in blood.40
At higher levels of lead exposure (40 parts per million and above)
humans can experience brain and nerve damage, kidney
37. See Tucker, supra note 8.
38. See Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, ToxFAQs for
Lead, Aug. 2007, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsl3.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2010).
39. California Department of Public Health, Frequently Asked Questions
About Lead Poisoning, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/CLPPB/Pages/FAQ-
CLPPB.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter CDPH Lead Poisoning].
40. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32240 (West 2002).
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impairment, and high blood pressure. 4 1  Further, in some
instances, high levels of lead exposure can cause seizures, comas,
and even result in death. 42 The buildup of lead in the body is
referred to as lead poisoning. 43
While there are a number of ways to be exposed to lead, the
primary means is through lead pigment coated on the interior of
older homes. 44 Until 1978, lead was an active ingredient in paint
utilized to coat both the interior and exterior of homes throughout
the United States. 45 The addition of lead to household paint
served to increase the robust nature of the color, improve the
ability to hide the surface it covers, and allow the coat of paint to
last longer.46 As lead paint deteriorates and decays, however,
lead chips and dust coat the ground, which can, in turn, be
ingested or inhaled. 47
Children are particularly susceptible to lead exposure and
subsequent poisoning.4 8 First, children spend much of their time
on the floor where lead dust is located and have a tendency to
place their hands, as well as foreign objects, in their mouth. 49
Second, they are particularly sensitive to the harmful effects of
lead; the bodies of children under the age of six have a tendency to
absorb more lead, and because their brains and nervous systems
are in critical stages of formation and development, they are
considerably more vulnerable to associated harmful effects. 50
Although it is difficult to discern exactly how many have been
affected by lead poisoning, it is estimated that, throughout the
United States, approximately 250,000 children between the ages
of one and five have blood lead levels at a point that require
41. Id.
42. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL., PROTECT
YouR FAMILY FROM LEAD IN YouR HOME 3 (2003) (on file with author).
43. CDPH Lead Poisoning, supra note 39.
44. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL., supra
note 42, at 4-5.
45. Id. at 4.
46. New York State Department of Health, Sources of Lead,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/environmental/lead/leadsources.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2010).
47. See id.
48. CAL. EDUc. CODE § 32240 (West 2002).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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health actions to be initiated.5 1 Further, of the approximately
twenty-four million housing units throughout the United States
with deteriorated lead paint and elevated levels of lead-
contaminated house dust, more than four million are home to one
or more young children.52
As a result of the health crisis posed by lead paint,
particularly to young children, federal and state governments
have enacted provisions aimed at reducing the presence of lead
pigment in residences. Nevertheless, the problem of lead
poisoning continues to plague the nation.
2. State Court Decisions Considering the Application of the Tort
of Public Nuisance against Lead Paint Manufacturers and
Distributors
i. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co.
In 2000, the City of St. Louis filed a public nuisance lawsuit
against former lead paint manufacturers seeking to recover costs
for a citywide program designed to abate lead paint.53 In its
complaint, the City argued that the "presence of lead paint in the
City's housing built before February 27, 1978, areas accessible to
the public, unreasonably interfere [d] with the public's health,
safety, welfare, and comfort and, accordingly, constitute[d] a
public nuisance." 54  During the course of discovery, the City
identified locations where it had incurred costs abating the lead
paint but was unable to identify the manufacturer of any of the
lead paint at issue.55 Nevertheless, the City maintained that
product identification was not required for a public nuisance claim
and that it was merely obligated to show that the defendants had
substantially contributed to the creation of the nuisance.56
The trial judge, and later the Supreme Court of Missouri,
51. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Prevention Tips,
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
52. Id.
53. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 112-13
(Mo. 2007).
54. Id. at 113.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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disagreed with the City's contention. 57 Specifically, the Supreme
Court determined that, in order to comply with the requisite
element of causation in a public nuisance action, a plaintiff must
identify the defendant who made or sold the product.5 s In its
analysis, the Court emphasized that accepting the City's approach
would implicitly adopt a market-share approach to liability, which
the Court had rejected on a prior occasion.59
Ultimately, the Court determined the City's public nuisance
claim did not adequately allege the required element of causation
because it failed identify the producer or seller of the lead paint at
issue.60 Accordingly, the Court sustained the trial judge's award
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.6 1
ii. City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co.
In 2003, the City of Chicago filed a public nuisance action
against a collection of entities that manufactured or sold lead
pigments or lead-based paint at some point prior to 1978.62 In its
complaint, the City alleged that the presence of lead-based paint
in Chicago constituted a public nuisance, which was created by
the defendants' manufacturing, marketing, and promoting of lead-
based paint for use in areas accessible to children long after
defendants knew or should have known it was hazardous. 63 The
trial judge determined that the City failed to state a claim and
consequently dismissed the action.64
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, citing a critical error in the City's claim: the failure
to demonstrate that defendants were the proximate cause of the
alleged public nuisance. 65 Specifically, the court held that the
City failed to allege the requisite "cause in fact" because it did not
identify any specific defendant as the source of lead paint at any
57. See id. at 113, 116-17.
58. Id. at 115.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 116-17.
61. See id.




65. Id. at 140.
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particular location. 66 The court noted that, to accept the City's
argument that a governmental plaintiff is not required to identify
which defendant manufactured the product in question would
constitute an adoption of a market-share liability theory, which
the Illinois Supreme Court had expressly rejected. 67 Further, the
court held the defendants' conduct in the manufacturing and
selling of lead-based paint was not a "legal cause" of the alleged
public nuisance.6 8  In arriving at this conclusion, the court
emphasized that public policy concerns dictated that "legal cause"
could not be established against the defendants in this case, given
that defendants merely produced a legal product decades ago that
was subsequently applied by third parties, and any hazard that
persisted throughout the City of Chicago was a product of the
landowners' failure to comply with existing laws that require them
to remove deteriorated paint.69
Given the court's determination that the City's public
nuisance complaint failed to adequately allege the two
requirements of proximate cause - "cause in fact" and "legal
cause" - the court held the trial judge properly dismissed the
action. 70 On May 25, 2005, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied
the City's appeal of the Appellate Court's decision. 71
iii. In re Lead Paint Litigation
In 2001, the City of Newark filed a complaint against a
number of companies that manufactured lead paint, or their
corporate successors, alleging a number of causes of action,
including public nuisance. 72 Shortly thereafter, twenty-five other
plaintiffs filed similar complaints, which were subsequently
consolidated by the court.73 In this action, plaintiffs sought to
recover the costs of detecting and removing lead paint from homes
and buildings, the costs of medical care to residents affected by
lead poisoning, and the costs of developing programs to educate
66. Id. at 134.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 136.
69. Id. at 139.
70. Id. at 140.
71. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 833 N.E.2d 1 (Table) (Ill. 2005).
72. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 487 (N.J. 2007).
73. Id.
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residents about the dangers of lead paint.74
The trial judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim. 75 The New Jersey
Court of Appeals overturned the trial judge's decision, however,
ruling that the plaintiffs stated a viable claim for public
nuisance. 76 Presented with these conflicting findings, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for
certification and accepted the issue for review.77
Upon review of the plaintiffs' public nuisance action, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately
allege a claim for public nuisance. 78 Specifically, the Court held
that the conduct which caused interference with the public health
was caused by the property owners' poor maintenance of premises
where lead paint was found, rather than any conduct by
defendants in their capacity as manufacturers. 79 As such, the
Court emphasized that the requisite element that the defendant
control the nuisance could not properly be alleged.80 Further, the
Court held that plaintiffs' public nuisance complaint
impermissibly sought monetary damages rather than abatement
of the nuisance.81 The Court emphasized that, in order to seek
monetary damages, the plaintiffs must specify a special injury,
different in kind rather than degree.82 According to the Court, the
plaintiffs failed to assert any special injury.83 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a
74. Id. at 486-87.
75. Id. at 487.
76. See id. at 488-89.
77. See id. at 489.
78. Id. at 487.
79. Id. at 501. The Court made three critical observations about the
foundation and parameters of the tort of public nuisance. "First, a public
nuisance, by definition, is related to conduct, performed in a location within
the actor's control, which has an adverse effect on a common right. Second, a
private party who has suffered special injury may seek to recover damages to
the extent of the special injury and, by extension, may also seek to abate.
Third, a public entity which proceeds against the one in control of the
nuisance may only seek to abate, at the expense of the one in control of the
nuisance." Id. at 499.
80. See id. at 501.
81. See id. at 502-03.
82. Id. at 503.
83. Id.
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viable public nuisance claim as applied in New Jersey.84
iv. State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc.
In 1999, the Attorney General of Rhode Island filed a public
nuisance action against a number of former lead pigment
manufacturers for the problems associated with childhood lead
poisoning throughout the State of Rhode Island.85 The State's
public nuisance complaint alleged that "[d]efendants created an
environmental hazard that continues and will continue to
unreasonably interfere with the health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience of the residents of the State, thereby constituting a
public nuisance."86 Following the longest civil trial in Rhode
Island history, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the State on
the public nuisance claim, and consequently, the defendants were
ordered to abate the created nuisance. 87 With this verdict, Rhode
Island became the first state in the nation where the tort of public
nuisance was successfully applied against manufacturers of lead
pigment.88
On appeal, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision, overturned the jury verdict.89. The Court
84. Id. In dissent, Chief Justice James R. Zazzali contended that
although prior application of the tort of public nuisance deviated from the
case at bar, public nuisance doctrine nevertheless provides "an appropriate
and efficient means for vindicating the public's right to be free from the
harmful effects of lead paint." Id. at 506 (Zazzali, C.J., dissenting).
Specifically, the Chief Justice emphasized that the tort of public nuisance has
historically been applied to "prevent[] the exploitation of the public and
shift[] the cost of abatement to those responsible for creating the nuisance."
Id. at 511. Therefore, according to the Chief Justice, public nuisance doctrine
should permit recovery "if the defendant is responsible for creating the
nuisance and, by virtue of the unjust benefit derived from the nuisance, can
fairly be required to fund abatement," even though the defendant may not
control the nuisance at issue. Id.
85. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 439 (R.I. 2008).
86. Id. at 453.
87. Id. at 442. The civil trial lasted for more than four months. See Abha
Bhattarai, Rhode Island Court Throws Out Jury Finding in Lead Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/business/ 02paint.html.
88. See Corry E. Stephenson, After Rhode Island's Public Nuisance Case,
Lead Paint Industry on the Defensive, LAWYERS USA, Apr. 23, 2007, available
at http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.comlindex.cfm/archive/view/id/4044 8 8.
89. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 435. The decision of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was announced by only four of the five Justices of the Court.
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held that the requisite elements of public nuisance were not
properly alleged, and the trial judge erred in failing to grant the
defendants' motion to dismiss at the outset of the trial.90
Specifically, the Court cited two errors in the State's complaint. 91
First, the Court held that the State failed to adequately allege an
interference with a public right.92 According to the Court, public
rights are a limited set of indivisible resources shared by the
public at large, such as air, water, or public rights of way, and
ultimately, the State's complaint failed to allege the requisite
interference with such.93 Second, the Court held that the tort of
public nuisance requires that the defendants control the
instrumentality causing the alleged nuisance at the time the
damage occurs. 94 Since the defendants did not have ownership or
control over the properties at issue, the Court held that this
required element of control was not met. 95 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the State failed to establish the requisite
elements of the tort of public nuisance as applied in Rhode Island,
and thus, the trial judge erred in failing to grant defendants'
motion to dismiss. 96
v. City of Milwaukee v. NL Industries
In 2001, the City of Milwaukee filed a suit against two former
lead paint producers alleging a number of causes of action -
including public nuisance - and sought compensatory and
equitable relief for abatement of the toxic lead hazards in homes,
restitution for the amounts expended by the City to abate lead
pigment from homes, and punitive damages.97 After the parties
completed discovery, the defendants moved for summary
judgment, which the trial judge granted. 98 Specifically, the trial
judge concluded that the City failed to prove that the defendants'
Justice Goldberg did not participate in the decision. Id. at 481.
90. Id. at 452-53.
91. See id. at 453.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 455.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 453.
97. City of Iilwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 890-91 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2004).
98. Id. at 891.
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paint was present on any property at issue, and thus, the City
failed to establish the requisite element of causation for its public
nuisance action.99
On appeal, however, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
reinstated the City's public nuisance action.oo The court noted
that causation, for the purpose of a public nuisance action in
Wisconsin, merely requires a finding that the defendants were a
substantial factor in creating the nuisance. 101 The court noted
that this was an issue of material fact to be considered by the
jury.102 Accordingly, the court overturned the trial judge's award
of summary judgment, and, following the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin's denial of defendants' petition for review, the case
proceeded to trial. 103
After a prolonged trial, the jury determined that the presence
of lead on properties throughout the City of Milwaukee
constituted a public nuisance. 104 However, the jury found that the
defendants' conduct did not cause the nuisance.105 Consequently,
judgment was entered for defendants.106
3. Setting the Stage in California
Despite the weight of authority of the jurisdictions previously
mentioned, a number of counties throughout the State of
California are nevertheless embarking down the public nuisance
path in the case of County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.107 Although some may suggest the plaintiffs in this action are
fighting an uphill battle, it is important to note that the plaintiffs
have already surpassed a crucial point in the case - they have
sufficiently stated a cognizable claim for public nuisance as
applied in California. 108 The California Court of Appeal for the
Sixth District overturned the trial judge's demurrer of plaintiffs'
99. Id. at 890.
100. Id. at 897.
101. Id. at 893.
102. Id.
103. See City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc. 703 N.W.2d 380 (Table)
(Wis. 2005).
104. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 6, at 979.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
108. See id. at 330.
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public nuisance claim, and the California Supreme Court denied
defendants' petition for review. Thus, the stage has been set in
California for what will certainly be a prolonged jury trial on the
issue of defendants' liability under the tort of public nuisance.
III. PUBLIC NUISANCE JURISPRUDENCE IN CALIFORNIA
In order to assess the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on their
public nuisance claim, it is important to first outline the
requirements of the tort of public nuisance in California, and, in
turn, to consider how it has previously been applied within the
state.
A. California's Statutory Scheme for Public Nuisance Law
In California, the basis of nuisance law derives from state
statute. "Nuisance" is defined as follows:
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not
limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is
indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to
the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream,
canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or
highway, is a nuisance. 109
Moreover, this statutory scheme defines "public nuisance" as
"one which affects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although
the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals
may be unequal.""l0 Further, the legislation dictates that "[n]o
lapse of time can legalize a public nuisance, amounting to an
actual obstruction of public right."111 Under this statutory
scheme, the remedies against a public nuisance are (1) indictment
or information; (2) a civil action; or (3) abatement.112
109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1997).
110. Id. § 3480.
111. Id. § 3490.
112. Id. § 3491.
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B. California Courts' Interpretation of the Requirements of the
Tort of Public Nuisance
California courts have further defined the requirements of a
public nuisance claim. Specifically, California courts have dictated
that a cognizable claim must assert (1) an interference with a
right common to the public, (2) which is both substantial and
unreasonable, (3) that affects a considerable number of persons,
(4) which the defendant created or assisted in creating.113 In order
to highlight the requirements of each of these respective elements,
it is essential to consider each individually.
1. An Interference with a Right Common to the Public
For the purpose of a public nuisance action, California courts
have consistently mandated that there be an interference with a
"right common to the public."114 The California Supreme Court,
drawing from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, has "identified
five general categories of public rights that, when unreasonably
interfered with, can give rise to a claim for public nuisance: the
public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public
comfort or the public convenience." 115
In consideration of what constitutes a public right, California
courts have seemingly taken a rather expansive view. While some
courts, such as Rhode Island and Illinois, have limited rights
common to the public to "shared resources such as air, water, or
public rights of way," 116 California courts have never provided
such a limited construction. Rather, California courts have found
a broad range of activities to interfere with rights common to the
public for the purpose of a public nuisance action. 117  Such
113. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604 (Cal. 1997); Birke
v. Oakwood Worldwide, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009);
County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006); People v. McDonald, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 433-34 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
114. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 604.
115. Ileto v. Glock, Inc. 349 F.3d 1191, 1209 (9th Cir. 2003); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (1979).
116. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008);
City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131-133 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005).
117. See Opening Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants County of Santa Clara
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activities include:118 gang activity,119 distributing and marketing
of firearms, 12 0 failure to warn about the dangers of chemicals,12 1
illegal billboards,122 obscene films,1 23 public urination, 124 fire
hazards,125 and water pollution.12 6 Indeed, consistent with this
et al. at 16-17, County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (No. CV 788657),
2004 WL 1513330.
118. See id.
119. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 618 (holding that local gang activity which
"routinely [obstructs]. . . residents' use of their own property-by such
activities as dealing drugs from apartment houses, lawns, carports, and even
residents' automobiles. . . [and] [obstructs] the 'free passage or use, in the
customary manner,' of the public streets," qualifies as public nuisance under
California law).
120. See Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1210-11, 1215 (holding that shooting victims
and their families stated a cognizable public nuisance claim under California
-law against manufacturers and distributors of guns used in shootings based
upon the defendants' firearm marketing and distribution schemes at issue).
121. See Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271
Cal. Rptr. 596, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that defendant's "design and
installation of unsafe disposal systems" coupled with its failure to warn about
potential problems such systems may pose to the underlying ground water
was a sufficient factual basis to support a claim that the defendant "created
or assisted in the creation of a public nuisance" under California law).
122. See People ex rel. Dept. Public Works v. The Golden Rule Church
Ass'n, 122 Cal. Rptr. 596, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the state has
the requisite police power to declare billboards a public nuisance under
California law for failing to conform to statutory requirements).
123. See People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theatre, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 85, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the exhibition of obscene films
could properly be considered a public nuisance under California law for which
abatement was an appropriate remedy). This case was overturned by the
U.S. Supreme Court on different grounds. See California ex rel. Cooper v.
Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1981). However, on remand,
the underlying holding in Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theatre - that
obscene films could constitute a public nuisance under California law - was
upheld. See People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theatre, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 728, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
124. See People v. McDonald, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 437 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (holding that defendant's urination in an empty public parking lot
adjacent to a public street constituted a public nuisance under California
law).
125. See County of San Diego v. Carlstrom, 16 Cal. Rptr. 667, 671 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1961) (holding that defendant's dilapidated residential structures posed
a significant fire hazard which, in turn, interfered with the comfort and
enjoyment of neighboring properties, and thus, qualified as a public nuisance
under California law).
126. See Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Super. Ct., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377,
381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that allegations that defendants discharged
hazardous substances in violation of state law which, in turn, entered the soil
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expansive list of activities that California courts have determined
to interfere with a public right, the California Supreme Court, in
People ex. Rel. Gallo v. Acuna, emphasized that the "principal
office of the centuries-old doctrine of the 'public nuisance' has been
the maintenance of public order - tranquility, security and
protection - when the criminal law proves inadequate."127
Ultimately, a review of the conduct that California courts
deem an interference with a right common to the public reveals
California courts have adopted a broad interpretation, which, in
due course, is considerably more expansive than the
interpretations of a number of jurisdictions that have addressed
the issue to date.
2. Substantial and Unreasonable Interference
For an interference with a right common to the public to be
actionable under public nuisance doctrine, California courts have
determined that the interference must be both "substantial and
unreasonable." 128
In making a determination whether an interference with a
right common to the public is "substantial," California courts
consider the significance of the harm and adjudge whether it
constitutes a "real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiffs
interests" which is "definitely offensive, seriously annoying or
intolerable." 129  In such, the courts utilize an objective
standard.130 Specifically, California courts have stated that "[i]f
normal persons in [a] locality would not be substantially annoyed
or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a significant
one."131 California courts have held that this is a question of fact,
which turns on the circumstances of each respective case. 132
In order to make a determination on the second prong of this
element, whether an interference with a right common to the
and polluted the groundwater stated a cognizable public nuisance claim
under California law).
127. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 284 (Cal. 1997).
128. Id. at 285.
129. Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 75, 105 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Super. Ct., 920 P.2d 669, 696
(Cal. 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979)).
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general public is "unreasonable," California courts weigh the
social utility of the activity against the gravity of the harm it
inflicts, taking into account a number of relevant factors. 133 Like
the determination of substantiality, the standard for determining
unreasonableness is objective; California courts inquire "whether
[a] reasonable [person], generally, looking at the whole situation
impartially and objectively, would consider [the activity]
unreasonable."134 This too, is a question of fact, which turns on
the circumstances of each respective case. 135
Given that the nature of inquiry into the substantiality and
unreasonableness of an activity for the purpose of a public
nuisance action is entirely fact-centered and case-specific, one
cannot draw a distinct bright line between activities that cause
substantial and unreasonable interferences and those that do not.
Ultimately, the trier of fact must determine the substantiality of
the interference and then, in turn, consider if it is unreasonable in
light of mitigating social utility.
3. Interference that Affects a Considerable Number of Persons
As California Civil Code § 3480, discussed above, dictates, "a
public nuisance is one which affects . . . an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons . . . ."136
Although California courts have never delineated a requisite
portion of a populous that must be affected by an interference,
they have undoubtedly adopted an expansive interpretation of this
requirement. Indeed, California courts have held a public
nuisance action can be maintained despite the fact that most
community members are not actually privy to it.137 For example,
in the case of People v. McDonald, the California Court of Appeal
for the First District upheld the trial court's holding that
defendant's urination in an empty parking lot adjacent to a public
roadway was sufficient to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property by a considerable number of persons,
133. Id. at 697.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1997).
137. See People v. McDonald, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 437 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
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and thus, constituted a public nuisance. 138 Nevertheless, in the
more common example of public nuisance actions in California,
courts have found interference with a portion of a community or
locality to sufficiently comply with this requisite element.139 For
example, in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, the Supreme Court of
California upheld the trial court's holding that local gang activity,
which included threats of violence to residents, murder, drive-by
shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson and other
associated crimes, constituted interference with the enjoyment of
life of a significant portion of the community, and consequently
qualified as a public nuisance. 140
4. Requisite Conduct by Defendant
In order to hold a defendant liable for a public nuisance,
California courts require that the "defendant created or assisted
in the creation of the nuisance."141  Under this approach,
California courts have consistently emphasized it is irrelevant
"whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the property
[which is the site of the nuisance], nor [if] [the defendant] is in a
position to abate the nuisance." 142 Rather, the critical question is
whether the defendant's conduct caused the nuisance or assisted
in its creation.143
Clearly, this approach to causation adopted by California
courts is more expansive than a number of other jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue to date. Unlike courts in Missouri and
Illinois, which mandate that defendants were the "cause in fact" of
the nuisance, 144 California courts merely require that defendants
assisted in the nuisance's creation. 145  Further, unlike the
138. Id. at 437.
139. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 969 P.2d 596, 615 (Cal. 1997).
140. Id.
141. See County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313,
325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Super.
Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
142. County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325.
143. Id.
144. See City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W. 3d 110, 115
(Mo. 2007); City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
145. See County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 341; City of Modesto
Redevelopment Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 872.
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Supreme Courts in Rhode Island and New Jersey, which require
defendants to control the instrumentality causing the alleged
nuisance at the time the damage occurs, 146 California courts have
not adopted such a restriction. Rather, as mentioned, California
courts have consistently emphasized that "liability for a public
nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses
or controls the property" which is the site of the nuisance. 147
Ultimately, a review of the requirements of the element of
causation for the purpose of a public nuisance as construed by
California courts reveals that they have taken a more relaxed
interpretation of this requisite element, which, in turn, is
considerably more expansive than a number of other jurisdictions
that addressed the issue.
5. Remedies that May be Sought
California's public nuisance statute dictates that remedies
available for a public nuisance action are: (1) indictment or
information; (2) a civil action; or (3) abatement.148 Nevertheless,
California courts have carved out a special rule for representative
public nuisance actions brought on behalf of the People. 149
Specifically, this rule dictates that "although California's general
nuisance statute expressly permits the recovery of damages in a
public nuisance action brought by a specifically injured party, it
does not grant a damage remedy in actions brought on behalf of
the People to abate a public nuisance."150 In order to ensure this
standard is upheld, California courts have held that "plaintiffs in
a representative public nuisance action may not . . . [seek]
damages in the form of 'costs of abatement."' 151
Despite this rule, California courts have expressly permitted a
representative public nuisance action to seek an injunction to
146. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n Inc. 951 A.2d 428, 455 (R.I. 2008); In
re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 499 (N.J. 2007).
147. County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325 (quoting City of
Modesto Redevelopment Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 865).
148. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3491 (West 1997).
149. See People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Am. Art Enters. Inc., 656 P.2d
1170, 1173 (Cal. 1983).
150. Id. at 1173, n.11.
151. County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 329 (citing County of San
Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance, 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 859-61 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986)).
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abate the nuisance itself.152 This is "accomplished in a court of
equity by means of an injunction [which is] proper and suitable to
the facts of each case." 153 The injunctive relief "should specifically
point out the things which the defendant is required to do and
refrain from doing in order to abate the nuisance," and is subject
to modification over time to accommodate changing conditions. 154
IV. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA V. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY:
GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. Lead Poisoning in California
The problems of lead poisoning are particularly pronounced
within the State of California. Indeed, the California State
Legislature declared that "childhood lead exposure represents the
most significant childhood environmental health problem in the
state today."ss Furthermore, as the Legislature noted, this
problem is compounded by the fact that "too little is known about
the prevalence, . . . severity, and location of these problems in
California."156 Although the extent of the prevalence of lead paint
in homes throughout California remains to be seen, recent
estimates suggest that more than eight million homes,
apartments, and condominiums throughout the State contain lead
paint, and more than 640,000 children face a high risk of lead
poisoning due to exposure. 157 This estimate places the State of
California third in the nation for the largest number of homes
posing a health risk for young children and their families.158
B. The Facts of the Case Relative to Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance
Claim
In March 2000, the County of Santa Clara filed a class action
152. See, e.g., People ex rel. Van de Kamp, 656 P.2d 1170.
153. Guttinger v. Calveras Cement Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 382, 390 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
154. Id. at 390-91.
155. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124125 (West 2006).
156. Id.
157. Press Release, National Health Law Program, California Assembly
Passes Bill to Test Children for Toxic Lead Poisoning from Toys and Home
Exposure (Aug. 14, 2008) (on file with author).
158. See id.
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complaint against a number of companies, or their successors-in-
interest, that manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold
lead pigment products, for the problems associated with lead
poisoning.159 In 2001, a number of cities, counties, and local
municipalities throughout the State of California joined the
suit.160  Following a series of amendments, the plaintiffs'
complaint alleged fraud and concealment, strict liability,
negligence, negligent breach of special duty, unfair business
practices and public nuisance. 161 Relative to the public nuisance
claim, plaintiffs alleged that the "presence of [1ead in paint in
homes and buildings in California unreasonably interferes with
the public health and safety of all residents of California who
come in contact with it."162 However, it is critical to note that
plaintiffs' public nuisance action was not solely based on
defendants' manufacture of a defective product. Specifically,
plaintiffs' alleged that defendants created and/or contributed to
the creation of the public nuisance through the following conduct:
[1] Engaging in a promotional campaign to increase the
use of [1]ead in paints and varnishes despite the fact that
[defendants] knew that such use was injurious, and even
potentially fatal, for children and other residents in the
State;
[2] Engaging in promotional activities that advocated the
use of [1]ead on toys and furniture and in residential
settings despite the fact that [defendants] knew that
children would come into contact with the toxic
substance;
[3] Engaging in a sham public relations campaign to
discredit medical and scientific literature that identified
[]ead in paints and coatings as a source (if not the
159. County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 320
(Cal Ct. App. 2006); Brief of Appellants at 3, n.1, County of Santa Clara, 40
Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (No. H026651) (The defendants in this action are: "Atlantic
Richfield Company, American Cyanamid Company, Conagra Grocery
Products Company, I.E. DuPont Nemours and Company, Glidden Company,
NL Industries, Inc., SCM Chemicals, and Sherwin-Williams Company.").
160. County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 320.
161. Id. at 320-21.
162. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants, supra note 117, at 17.
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primary source) of lead poisoning; and
[4] Developing marketing ploys to ensure that lead was
distributed as far and wide in California as possible.163
Clearly, the plaintiffs' complaint does not allege that defendants'
liability under the tort of public nuisance hinges solely on their
manufacture and distribution of the product.164 Rather, the
plaintiffs averred that the creation of a public nuisance derived
from the defendants' conduct in the marketing and promotion of a
hazardous product that the defendants knew posed health risks to
the general population.165 In order to remedy the alleged public
nuisance, plaintiffs sought abatement of the lead paint in the
homes and buildings throughout their respective localities. 166
C. Procedural History of the Case Relative to Plaintiffs' Public
Nuisance Claim
Following a series of amendments to the complaint by the
plaintiffs, the defendants filed a demurrer to the plaintiffs' public
nuisance cause of action. 16 7 In addressing this demurrer, the trial
justice considered the issue "novel as to whether or not public
nuisance is going to be extended to this kind of conduct .... ."168
After giving due consideration to the issue, the trial judge
sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend.169
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District overturned the trial judge's grant of demurrer to the
plaintiffs' representative public nuisance cause of action on behalf
of the People of California.170 In the first portion of its analysis,
163. See Brief of Appellants at 18, supra note 159.
164. See County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 328.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 329.
167. See id. at 321.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 330. However the court determined that the plaintiff
governmental entities were not entitled to pursue a public nuisance action on
their own behalf seeking damages. Id. at 331. According to the court, unlike
the plaintiffs' representative public nuisance claim, this "cause of action is
much more like a products liability cause of action because it is, at its core,
an action for damages for injuries caused to plaintiffs' property by a product.
. and the court is "reluctant to extend liability for damages under a public
nuisance theory to an arena that is otherwise fully encompassed by products
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the court considered whether the plaintiffs properly alleged the
existence of a public nuisance as applied in California. 171 The
court pointed out that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that "lead
causes grave harm, is injurious to health, and interferes with the
comfort and enjoyment of life and property."172 Accordingly, the
trial judge held that the plaintiffs' complaint "clearly. . . was
adequate to allege the existence of a public nuisance for which [the
plaintiffs], acting as the People, could seek abatement." 173
In the second portion of its analysis, the court considered
whether the defendants could potentially be held responsible for
the creation of the purported public nuisance. 174 As such, the
court noted that the plaintiffs alleged that:
[D]efendants assisted in the creation of the nuisance by
concealing the dangers of lead, mounting a campaign
against regulation of lead, and promoting lead paint for
interior use even though defendants had known for
nearly a century that such a use of lead paint was
hazardous to human beings. 175
Further, the court noted that the plaintiffs properly sought
abatement of the lead paint as a remedy to the nuisance. 176 Given
these factors, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint
sufficiently alleged a set of factors that could lead to a finding the
defendants caused or substantially contributed to the nuisance. 177
Based on the court's determination that the plaintiffs
sufficiently pleaded the requisite elements for a representative
public nuisance action as applied in California, the court held that
the trial judge erred in sustaining defendants' demurrer. 178 In
June 2006, the Supreme Court of California denied defendants'
petition for review of this decision. 179 Thereupon, the case was
remanded to the trial court for commencement of a trial on
liability law." Id. (emphasis in original).
171. See id. at 324-25.
172. Id. at 325-26.
173. Id. at 326.
174. See id. at 325-30.
175. Id. at 325.
176. Id. at 329.
177. See id. at 328.
178. See id. at 330.
179. See County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2006 Cal. LEXIS
7622, at *1 (Cal. Jun. 21, 2006).
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plaintiffs' representative public nuisance claim.
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD THAT PLAINTIFFS WILL
PREVAIL ON THE PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION
The California Court of Appeal's determination that the
Santa Clara plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a public nuisance cause
of action stands as a significant victory for the plaintiffs in this
action. Indeed, as the aforementioned overview of public nuisance
litigation demonstrates, the majority of state courts that have
addressed the issue to date have held that such complaints fail to
allege the requisite elements of the tort as applied in the state's
respective jurisdiction. With this initial, yet nonetheless
significant, victory, the plaintiffs have been given the opportunity
to present their case to a jury. Although this panel of California
residents will ultimately serve as the fact finders in this case, an
assessment of the preliminary facts of the case relative to the
respective elements of the tort of public nuisance as applied in
California will provide insight into the probable result.
A. Did Defendants Interfere with a Right Common to the
General Public?
As the aforementioned analysis of public nuisance
jurisprudence in California demonstrates, California has taken a
considerably more expansive interpretation of what constitutes
interference with a right common to the general public than a
number of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Unlike
some courts that have limited rights common to the public to
"shared resources such as air, water, or public rights of way,"so
California courts have never provided such a limited construction,
but rather, have found a broad range of activities to interfere with
rights common to the public for the purpose of a public nuisance
action. 181 Specifically, the California Supreme Court has
"identified five general categories of public rights that, when
unreasonably interfered with, can give rise to a claim for public
180. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008);
City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131-33 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005).
181. See An Interference with a Right Common to the Public, supra
section III B (1); see also Brief of Appellants at 18, supra note 159.
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nuisance: the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort, or the public convenience." 182
Consideration of the facts of this case could lend support to
the conclusion that the defendants' conduct resulted in an
interference with a number of these respective categories of public
rights. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants' manufacturing and
subsequent marketing and promoting of lead paint, a product
widely known to be hazardous, resulted in its mass utilization in
and around households throughout the State of California. 183
Plaintiffs additionally allege, with ample evidentiary support, that
lead paint exposure poses a significant health risk to the people,
particularly the children, of the State of California. 184 Indeed, as
mentioned, the severe health risks stemming from lead paint
exposure have been well documented by the California State
Legislature, finding that "childhood lead exposure represents the
most significant childhood environmental health problem in the
state today . . . ."185 Accordingly, there seems to be a sufficient
foundation for a jury to conclude that the presence of lead paint in
residences throughout the state constitutes an interference with
the public health and safety.
B. Is the Interference Substantial?
For a public nuisance action to lie in California, the
interference with a right common to the general public must be
substantial. 186 In order to determine whether an interference is
substantial, California courts consider the significance of the
harm and look to see if it constitutes a "real and appreciable
invasion of the plaintiffs interests" which is "definitely offensive,
seriously annoying or intolerable."187 As such, the courts utilize
an objective standard whereby a jury inquires "[if normal persons
in [a] locality" would be "substantially annoyed or disturbed by the
situation."188
182. Ileto v. Glock, Inc. 349 F.3d 1191, 1209 (9th Cir. 2003).
183. See Brief of Appellants at 18, supra note 159.
184. See id.
185. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124125 (West 2006).
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In this case, there appears to be significant evidence for a jury
to objectively conclude that lead paint poses a substantial
interference with the health and safety of California residents. As
highlighted in Section II, the adverse effects caused by lead
exposure are well-known and irrefutable. Lead is a toxic chemical
that can cause an array of serious health problems persisting
throughout the entirety of one's life.189 Low levels of lead in the
human body can impair cognitive development, cause a loss of
I.Q., slow the body's growth and development rate, and inhibit the
formation of enzymes in blood.190  At higher levels of lead
exposure, humans can experience brain and nerve damage, kidney
impairment, and high blood pressure. 191  In fact, in some
instances, high levels of lead exposure can cause seizures, comas,
and even death.192
The truly substantial nature of the interference with the
public health and safety, however, comes into perspective when
one considers the prevalence of lead paint throughout homes in
California. While the plaintiffs have not yet identified the
purported number of homes that contain lead paint, recent
estimates reveal this number is significant. In fact, with an
estimated eight million homes that contain lead paint, California
is ranked third throughout the nation for the largest number of
homes posing a threat of lead poisoning. 193 Consequently, a jury
will most certainly be presented with evidence that the amount of
lead paint in homes throughout the plaintiffs' localities is
considerable.
Given that the health effects associated with lead exposure
are significant and the evidence at trial will, in all likelihood,
indicate that lead paint is still widely present throughout the
State of California, it seems probable that a jury will conclude
that lead paint poses a substantial interference with the public
health and safety.
189. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32240 (West 2002) (notes).
190. Id. at note (j).
191. Id.
192. UNITED STATEs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL., supra
note 42, at 3.
193. See Press Release, National Health Law Program, supra note 157.
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C. Is the Interference Unreasonable?
In addition to the requirement of substantiality, California
courts also mandate that an interference with a right common to
the general public is unreasonable. 194  In order to make a
determination whether an interference with a right common to the
general public is unreasonable, California courts weigh the social
utility of the activity against the gravity of the harm it inflicts.195
Like the determination of substantiality, the standard for
determining unreasonableness is objective; California courts
inquire "whether [a] reasonable [person], generally, looking at the
whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider [the
activity] unreasonable."196
In this case, there is ample evidence for a jury to conclude
that the problems associated with lead paint constitute an
unreasonable interference with the public health and safety. As
the aforementioned review of the health problems associated with
lead paint exposure indicates, lead paint poses a significant health
risk to all those who come into contact with it. Conversely, the
social utility that lead paint provides is minimal; the addition of
lead to household paint merely serves to increase the robust
nature of the color, improve the ability to hide the surface it
covers, and allow the coat of paint to last longer.197 Ultimately,
any utility obtained by adding lead to pigment is merely aesthetic.
Accordingly, given that lead paint poses a number of
significant health risks and provides minor, perhaps negligible,
social utility, there is certainly ample evidence for a jury to
conclude that lead paint constitutes an unreasonable interference
with the health and safety of Californians.
D. Does the Interference Affect a Considerable Number of
Persons?
When assessing the nature of an interference with a right
common to the general public for the purpose of a public nuisance
194. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Super. Ct., 920 P.2d 669 (Cal.
1996).
195. Id. at 697.
196. Id.
197. See New York State Department of Health, Sources of Lead, supra
note 46.
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action, California courts require that the rights of a considerable
number of persons are affected. 198
Ultimately, a determination on this issue will hinge on the
prevalence of the lead paint throughout the plaintiffs' respective
localities. Nevertheless, as the discussion of the prevalence of lead
paint throughout California suggests, a jury will, in all likelihood,
be presented with evidence that lead paint is present in and
around an overwhelming number of homes throughout the State
of California. Thus, it seems likely that a jury will conclude that a
considerable number of people are affected by the purported public
nuisance.
E. Did the Defendants Create or Assist in the Creation of the
Public Nuisance?
In order to hold a defendant liable under public nuisance
jurisprudence, California courts mandate that the "defendant
created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance."199 Under this
approach, California courts have consistently emphasized it is
irrelevant "whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the
property [which is the site of the nuisance], nor [ifJ [the defendant]
is in a position to abate the nuisance."200 Rather, the critical
question is whether the defendant's conduct caused the nuisance
or assisted in its creation.201
While a jury's determination on this respective element is, by
far, the most difficult to predict, there nevertheless seems to be
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendants in
this case assisted in the creation of a public nuisance. Here, the
plaintiffs aver that the defendants engaged in a rigorous
marketing campaign in California to promote a hazardous product
they manufactured, which they knew posed a significant health
risk to the general population.202 Further, plaintiffs allege that,
in their promotional efforts, the defendants engaged in a sham
public relations campaign to discredit medical and scientific
198. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3480 (West 1997).
199. County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006); City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Super. Ct., 13
Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
200. County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 327.
201. Id.
202. See Brief of Appellants at 18, supra note 159.
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findings that lead paint was the primary source of lead
poisoning. 203
These allegations, if adequately supported, could undoubtedly
lead one to conclude that the defendants assisted in the creation of
a public nuisance posed by lead paint exposure. Specifically, these
allegations demonstrate that the defendants engaged in a
systematic effort to increase the prevalence of lead paint, despite
the fact that they knew it posed a severe health risk for those who
would come into contact with it. Indeed, one could surely find that
that prevalence of lead paint throughout the State of California
and its consequences are a result of the defendants' conduct.
Accordingly, a jury could potentially find that the defendants'
conduct in manufacturing, rigorously marketing, and distributing
lead paint assisted in the creation of the public nuisance.
It should be noted, however, that it is by no means clear how
a jury will find on this issue of causation. Indeed, there are a
number of mitigating factors which the defendants will
undoubtedly identify in order to suggest they did not cause or
assist in the creation of the public nuisance. Principally, the
defendants will surely posit that the purported public nuisance
derives not from any conduct on their part, but rather, from the
homeowners' conduct in permitting the lead paint on the interior
of their homes to deteriorate and decay which, in turn, can be
ingested or inhaled. It remains to be seen how a jury will receive
this argument.
Nevertheless, because California merely requires that the
defendants assisted in the creation of the nuisance, the plaintiffs
will likely have a chance of success in establishing the requisite
causation. 204 After all, plaintiffs need not demonstrate that the
defendants' conduct was the sole cause of the public nuisance, but
rather, that it was a factor in its creation. 205 Accordingly, given
California's more expansive interpretation of the element of
causation for a public nuisance action, a jury may indeed find that
the defendants' conduct in manufacturing, marketing, and
distributing a product which they knew to be hazardous, assisted
in the creation of the public nuisance.
203. See id.
204. See City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 872.
205. See id.
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F. Are the Defendants Able to Abate the Public Nuisance?
If a jury were to find that the defendants' manufacture,
promotion, and distribution of lead paint created or assisted in the
creation of a substantial and unreasonable interference with a
right common to the public, one question would remain: are the
defendants able to abate the public nuisance? This question will
not be posed to a jury, however.206 Rather, a court of equity is
assigned the task of considering the nature of the nuisance and
consequently determining the nature of injunctive relief
required. 207
On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, the defendants
argued that the trial judge properly granted a demurrer to the
plaintiffs' public nuisance action, in part, because defendants
lacked the ability to abate the nuisance. 208 The defendants
contended that they were "in no position to abate," because they
did not "own or control" the buildings where the lead paint was
located. 209  Although the court held the plaintiffs need not
establish the defendants' ability to abate the purported nuisance
for the purpose of stating a cognizable claim for public nuisance,
the issue is far from determined. 2 10 Surely the defendants will
reattempt this argument before a court of equity if a jury finds
they created or assisted in the creation of a public nuisance.
Nevertheless, in a brief to the court, the plaintiffs posited a
number of potential means for abatement of the public nuisance,
which, in their own right, are compelling.211 Foremost of these is
the argument that the defendants be ordered to enter the
properties of those who consent and subsequently remove the lead
paint contained therein.212 Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that
an injunctive order could require the defendants to "[distribute] to
206. See Guttinger v. Calveras Cement Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 382, 390
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
207. Id.
208. See County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313,
329 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
209. Id. at 330.
210. Id.
211. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney on
Behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants at 13-17, County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 313 (No. CV 788657), 2004 WL 3256105.
212. See id. at 14-15.
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the property owners a product designed to encapsulate the lead
paint, [establish] service centers to test lead levels in blood or
paint samples, or [institute] programs to educate the public about
the hazards of lead paint and how to minimize the risk of lead
poisoning."2 13 Ultimately, the plaintiffs put forth a number of
compelling means by which the defendants may abate the
nuisance caused by lead paint without controlling the properties
at issue.
Given that there are a number of ways for the defendants to
abate the nuisance without having ownership or control of the
properties in question, it seems likely that a court of equity could
find a sufficient means for defendants to abate the nuisance posed
by lead paint.
CONCLUSION
Although the tort of public nuisance has not yet been applied
successfully against a former lead pigment manufacturer for the
problems associated with lead poisoning by any municipality or
state throughout the nation, the plaintiffs in the California case of
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. have a number of
defined advantages which make it probable that they may be the
first to successfully bring such an action. Foremost of these
advantages is California's adoption of a more expansive
interpretation of the tort of public nuisance than a number of
other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue: California
courts broadly construe the qualification of a public right, merely
require defendants' conduct assist in the creation of the nuisance,
and do not require defendants to control the instrumentality
causing the nuisance. Indeed, operating under this more
expansive public nuisance framework, the Santa Clara plaintiffs
have achieved a feat that the vast majority of similarly situated
plaintiffs have failed to accomplish - they have stated a cognizable
public nuisance claim and are able to present their case to a jury.
Going forward, it is impossible to state, with absolute
certainty, how a jury will find in this case. Nevertheless, an
overview of the requisite elements of the tort of public nuisance as
applied in California relative to the preliminary facts of this case
reveals that the plaintiffs have a high likelihood of success.
213. Id. at 15-16.
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Provided that the plaintiffs' allegations are adequately supported,
a jury could find that the defendants' conduct in manufacturing,
promoting, and distributing a product which they knew to be
hazardous has subsequently assisted in the creation of a
substantial and unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public of California. As such, it seems likely that the
Santa Clara plaintiffs may, in fact, succeed where so many other
state and local officials throughout the nation have failed.
Only time will tell if the plaintiffs in this action will emerge
from the "impenetrable jungle" of public nuisance law with a
judgment that provides redress for the widespread lead
contamination in residences throughout the State - the most
significant environmental health problem that plagues California
to this day. For now, with all eyes watching, the Santa Clara
plaintiffs press on.

